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ABSTRACT 
After a lengthy premarket approval process, the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) has just deemed AquAdvantage 
Salmon, a fast-growing, genetically engineered salmon, safe for 
human consumption.  AquAdvantage Salmon is the first 
genetically engineered animal designed for human consumption 
to go to market in the United States.  Because there have been no 
significant changes to the statutory or regulatory framework 
governing agricultural biotechnology since it was established in 
the 1980s, the FDA reviews applications of genetically 
engineered animals under the New Animal Drug Application 
(NADA) provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA).  The FDA’s treatment of genetically engineered food as 
a new animal drug has been criticized due to potential 
environmental and human health risks, and because of a lack of 
transparency throughout the regulatory process.  After providing 
an overview of the premarket approval process, this Issue Brief 
argues that even under the NADA provisions, the FDA’s 
premarket approval risk assessment should be more transparent.  
In particular, the justification for trade secret status of relevant 
biotechnology is undermined, if not extinguished, by the need for 
public consideration of the biotechnology’s safety and 
effectiveness after a certain time in the approval process. 
Furthermore, the comment period prior to advisory committee 
meetings should be lengthened to allow for greater scientific 
input on safety and effectiveness, and an independent body 
should be created to communicate with the public about food 
safety.  
INTRODUCTION  
 Within the field of genetic engineering, recombinant DNA 
(rDNA) technology is introduced into an organism to promote a targeted 
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trait.1  A genetically engineered animal (or genetically modified 
organism) is one that contains an rDNA construct producing a new, 
desirable trait.2  The genes and other segments of DNA that are part of 
the rDNA construct may be obtained from other organisms or 
synthesized in a laboratory setting.3  Genetic engineering has been used 
in a wide array of contexts: agriculture, to produce crops resistant to 
pests or herbicides; medicine, to develop microbes that can produce 
pharmaceuticals for human or animal use; and food, to produce 
microorganisms that aid in baking, brewing, and cheese-making.4  While 
it has not yet been commercially used to produce animals intended for 
human consumption, this is soon to change.5     
 AquAdvantage Salmon, produced by AquaBounty Technologies, 
Inc., is a genetically engineered fish intended for human consumption 
under active review by the FDA.  In 1989, the precursor to the 
AquAdvantage Salmon line was created by injecting an Atlantic salmon 
egg with a gene construct containing a promoter and termination region 
from the ocean pout antifreeze gene and a growth hormone gene from 
Chinook salmon.6  The ocean pout antifreeze promoter had been shown 
to continually express growth hormone in salmon, unlike the native 
                                                
1 Genetic Engineering, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 23, 2011), 
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEn
gineering/default.htm. 
2 Id.  
3 General Q&A, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 23, 2011), 
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEn
gineering/GeneticallyEngineeredAnimals/ucm113605.htm.16, 2012).  
4 Id. 
5 See, e.g., Jim Kozubek, FDA Decision Will Lead to First Ever Genetically-
Modified Animal for Consumption, TMP IDEALAB (Oct. 10, 2011, 10:00 AM), 
http://idealab.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/10/fda-nears-decision-on-
genetically-engineered-salmon.php (stating that the FDA has completed its 
“evaluation of the environmental impact of the world’s first genetically 
engineered (GE) fish for human consumption, and written a document 
supportive of its commercialization on the U.S. market.”). 
6 See Anastasia Bodnar, Risk Assessment and Mitigation of AquAdvantage 
Salmon, BIOFORTIFIED (Oct. 16, 2010), http://www.biofortified.org/2010/ 
10/salmon/.  A promoter is the first region of a gene.  It acts as a genetic switch, 
turning the gene on and off and specifying how many copies of the protein will 
be produced.  The termination sequence, as the name indicates, follows the 
promoter and coding region, and signals the end of the gene so the rest of the 
chromosome is not read.  See, e.g., Gene Regions, AGBIOSAFETY AT THE 
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA-LINCOLN (last visited April 8, 2012), 
http://agbiosafety.unl.edu/education/gene.htm. 
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growth hormone promoter in salmon.7  Increased expression of the 
growth hormone in the transgenic8 salmon results in fish that grow more 
quickly in early life than their natural comparators.9  If approved by the 
FDA, AquAdvantage Salmon’s broodstock would consist of 
phenotypically sex-reversed, homozygous females (that is, females 
having two copies of the transgene), which would cross with non-
transgenic female Atlantic salmon to produce eggs with a single-copy of 
the transgene.10  These eggs would be pressure-shocked to induce 
triploidy, which inhibits sexual development and renders them 98.9% 
sterile.11  In other words, AquAdvantage Salmon would be mostly sterile 
salmon with the ability to grow to market size in less time than their non-
transgenic counterparts.  
 The FDA regulates genetically engineered animals as animal 
drugs under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).12  While 
this regulatory approach has certain advantages—a “new animal drug” is 
not generally recognized as safe,13 and its safety must be determined with 
“reference to the health of man or animal”14—it is not without its 
disadvantages.  Criticisms have centered on four major issues: (1) the 
general inadequacy and outdated mechanisms of the regulatory 
framework; (2) the possible environmental risks, and the related need for 
a comprehensive environmental impact statement; (3) the possible 
adverse effects on human health (for example, increased allergenicity); 
                                                
7 Id.  
8 A “transgenic” animal is an organism that has had a “synthetic gene . . . 
constructed in vitro incorporated into its genome with the intended purpose of 
modifying its phenotype.” See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BRIEFING PACKET 
vii (2010) [hereinafter BRIEFING PACKET], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMateri
als/VeterinaryMedicineAdvisoryCommittee/UCM224762.pdf. 
9 See id. at 24. 
10 AQUA BOUNTY TECHS., INC., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR 
AQUADVANTAGE SALMON 13 (2010) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommit 
tees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/VeterinaryMedicineAdvisoryCommittee/UC
M224760.pdf. 
11 Id.  
12 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: REGULATION OF 
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS CONTAINING HERITABLE RECOMBINANT 
DNA CONSTRUCTS 5 (2011) [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY], available 
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnfo 
rcement/GuidanceforIndustry/UCM113903.pdf. 
13 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(v)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(v)(1). 
14 Id. at § 321(u)(1).  
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and (4) the lack of transparency and public input afforded under the New 
Animal Drug Application (NADA) provisions of the FDCA. 
 This Issue Brief examines the premarket approval process as 
applied to the AquAdvantage Salmon so as to explore this fourth issue—
the lack of transparency within the current regulatory process.  Part I will 
provide a brief overview of the ubiquity of genetically engineered food 
and the different ways in which animals have been used and are being 
used in genetic engineering.  Part II explains the regulatory framework 
for NADAs in greater detail, including recently issued guidance provided 
by the FDA, and Part III explains how this framework has been applied 
to AquAdvantage Salmon, focusing on public meetings held in 
September 2010.  Finally, Part IV provides reasons to increase the 
transparency of the premarket process and suggests several mechanisms 
that might achieve this goal.  In particular, public disclosure of trade 
secrets at the public advisory committee meetings, which the FDA 
intends to hold for all applications for genetically engineered animals 
intended for human consumption, provides a reason to reduce 
transparency immediately before and after such disclosures.  Two other 
mechanisms for increased public review are briefly discussed: 
lengthening the comment period prior to the advisory committee 
meetings, and creating an independent body, like the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA), to communicate with the public about food 
safety.                  
I. GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS AS FOOD 
 In 1994, the first genetically engineered food item approved for 
human consumption, the Falvr Savr tomato (a tomato engineered to ripen 
slowly), was introduced to the market.15  In 2011, 88% of all corn16 and 
94% of all soybeans17 planted in the United States were genetically 
engineered.  Because “many processed food products contain corn or 
soybean ingredients,”18 the consumer group Food & Water Watch has 
estimated that 70 to 75% of processed foods on supermarket shelves 
                                                
15 Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: 
Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2167, 2176 (2004). 
16 ACREAGE, NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 25 (June 
2012), available at http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/current/Acre/Acre-06-
29-2012.pdf.   
17 Id. at 27.  
18 Patrick Byrne, Labeling of Genetically Engineered Foods, COLO. STATE 
UNIV. (Sept. 2010), http://www.ext.colostate.edu/pubs/foodnut/09371.html. 
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contain genetically engineered ingredients.19  Despite the ubiquity of 
genetically engineered foods in our diet, genetic alteration of food has 
thus far been limited to non-animal products.20  That is about to change, 
as the FDA has been reviewing a completed NADA for a genetically 
engineered salmon, the AquAdvantage Salmon, since 2010.21  On 
December 20, 2012, the FDA released its draft environmental assessment 
of the proposed conditions of use and its preliminary finding of no 
significant impact (FONSI) for the AquAdvantage Salmon application, 
triggering a 60-day public comment period.22  The preliminary FONSI 
concluded that food from AquAdvantage Salmon is “as safe as food from 
conventional Atlantic salmon”23 and that the “development, production, 
and grow-out of AquAdvantage Salmon . . . will not result in significant 
effects on the quality of the human environment in the United States.”24  
Once approved, the salmon will become the first genetically engineered 
animal approved for human consumption in the United States.25       
 Proponents of genetic engineering emphasize the many benefits 
genetically engineered crops and animals provide to consumers.26  The 
largest class of genetically engineered animals being developed is for 
                                                
19 Saundra Young, Safety of Genetically Modified Salmon Debated, CNN (Sept. 
20, 2010, 8:10 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/09/20/genetically. 
engineered.salmon/index.html. 
20 See Michael B. Homer, Comment, Frankenfish . . . It’s What’s for Dinner: 
The FDA, Genetically Engineered Salmon, and the Flawed Regulation of 
Biotechnology, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 83, 86 (2011) (listing the benefits 
“yielded by the widespread cultivation of [genetically engineered] food 
products”).   
21 See AQUABOUNTY TECHS., INC., PROPOSED FUNDRAISE OF $2.0 MILLION 
(APPROXIMATELY £1.3 MILLION) BEFORE EXPENSES AND ISSUANCE OF 
FUNDRAISING CIRCULAR 3 (2012) [hereinafter PROPOSAL], available at 
http://www.aquabounty.com/documents/press/2012/20120222Fundraising.pdf. 
22 Draft Environmental Assessment and Preliminary Finding of No Significant 
Impact Concerning a Genetically Engineered Atlantic Salmon, 77 Fed. Reg. 
76,050 (Dec. 26, 2012). 
23 CTR. FOR VETERINARY MED., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. & DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., PRELIMINARY FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT: 
AQUADVANTAGE SALMON 3 (May 4, 2012), available at http://www.fda. 
gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngine
ering/GeneticallyEngineeredAnimals/UCM333105.pdf?source=govdelivery.  
24 Id. at 4. 
25 Paul Voosen, Panel Advises More Aggressive FDA Analysis of Engineered 
Salmon, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010 
/09/21/21greenwire-panel-advises-more-aggressive-fda-analysis-of-
71171.html?pagewanted=all.   
26 See Homer, supra note 20, at 90–92.  
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biopharm purposes—animals that produce substances that can be used as 
human or animal pharmaceuticals.27  For example, an environmental 
assessment has been prepared supporting a NADA for goats that have 
been genetically engineered to express recombinant human antithrombin 
III (“ATRYN”) in the milk of lactacting does.28  ATRYN is intended to 
treat patients with congenital antithrombin III deficiency in order to 
prevent life-threatening clot formation during high-risk situations.29  
Other genetically engineered products are intended for use as food and 
may be disease resistant or have improved nutritional characteristics over 
their natural comparators.30  For example, scientists have engineered 
hens to lay low-cholesterol eggs.31     
 Despite the many advantages offered by genetically engineered 
animals, the premarket approval process for AquAdvantage Salmon has 
sustained heavy criticism from consumer advocacy groups and 
legislators.32  The next two parts will enumerate the criticisms of the 
                                                
27 General Q&A, supra note 3. 
28 GTC BIOTHERAPEUTICS, INC., FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT FOR THE 
BC6 RDNA CONSTRUCT IN GTC 155-92 GOATS EXPRESSING RECOMBINANT 




30 General Q&A, supra note 3.  
31 Shelley Smithson, Genetically Modified Animals Could Make It to Your Plate 
with Minimal Testing — and No Public Input, GRIST (July 30, 2003, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.grist.org/article/and3./. 
32 For example, in early February of 2012, Food and Water Watch, Consumers 
Union, and the Center for Food Safety filed a petition asking the FDA to test the 
genetically engineered salmon as a food additive instead of as a new animal 
drug.  Consumer Groups Demand Rigorous Government Study of Genetically 
Engineered Salmon’s Hazards to Human Health, BETWEEN THE LINES (Feb. 22, 
2012), http://www.btlonline.org/2012/seg/120302cf-btl-lovera.html. The groups 
also urged the FDA to conduct an environmental study to examine what would 
happen were the salmon to escape and carry disease to or breed with non-
transgenic salmon species.  Id.  A handful of House Representatives voted in 
June of 2011 to attach an amendment to an agriculture spending bill that would 
ban the FDA from spending any funds on genetically engineered salmon 
approvals beginning in 2012.  Paul Voosen, House Moves to Ban Modified 
Salmon, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/0 
6/16/16greenwire-house-moves-to-ban-modified-salmon-84165.html. A month 
later, a group of senators asked the FDA to abandon its approval process on the 
application, threatening to push legislation to strip the FDA’s funding to study 
the fish if the agency failed to comply.  Id. 
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premarket approval process and the risk assessment submitted in the case 
of the AquAdvantage Salmon. 
II. THE COORDINATED FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 As biotechnology research became more popular in the early 
1980s, the application of existing statutes to biotechnology led to 
questions about which statutes applied to which issues and which 
agencies were responsible under the existing statutory and regulatory 
scheme.33  In response, the Reagan Administration created the Domestic 
Policy Council Working Group on Biotechnology, charged with drafting 
an overall federal framework for regulating biotechnology.34  The White 
House Office of Science and Technology Policy promulgated the 
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology (Coordinated 
Framework) in 1986.35  The Coordinated Framework maintained that 
existing statutes were sufficient to provide agencies with jurisdiction and 
authority to ensure adequate regulation of biotechnology, although 
legislative action could be taken as the field advanced.36 
 The Coordinated Framework, while not legally binding, 
distributed regulatory responsibilities to three agencies—the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), and the FDA—based on pre-existing statutory 
mandates.37  The working group concluded that “for the most part 
[existing laws] as currently implemented would address regulatory needs 
adequately.”38  As the Pew Initiative has noted, this has encouraged 
                                                
33 See PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD & BIOTECHNOLOGY, GUIDE TO U.S. 
REGULATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS 5 (2001) [hereinafter PEW INITIATIVE], available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_
Biotechnology/hhs_biotech_0901.pdf (“[T]he application of existing statutes to 
biotechnology led to significant questions about overlapping authorities among 
the agencies, as well as uncertainties about whether the agencies would follow 
consistent approaches in using these authorities.”). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 5–6; Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 1986). 
36 PEW INITIATIVE, supra note 33, at 6. 
37 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 
23,304 (stating that the agencies involved have “extensive experience with 
products that involve living organisms” and that new developments will be 
reviewed by the FDA, USDA, and EPA in the same manner for safety).    
38 Id. at 23,303.  
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agencies to reinterpret old statutes in order to fit new biotechnology 
products into decades-old legal frameworks.39                
 The FDA is in charge of evaluating food safety issues for all 
genetically engineered products intended for human consumption.  Since 
developers first approached the FDA with genetically engineered 
animals, the FDA has chosen to regulate those animals under the new 
animal drug provisions of the FDCA.40  On January 1, 2009, nearly eight 
years after AquaBounty Technologies first filed a NADA, the FDA 
issued a “Final Guidance Document” on regulating genetically 
engineered animals to alleviate confusion about the premarket approval 
process and the statutory scheme currently applied to genetically 
engineered animals intended for human consumption.41 
 Under the new animal drug provisions of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 
321 et seq., the definition of a drug includes “articles intended for use in 
the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man 
or other animals” and “articles (other than food) intended to affect the 
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.”42  The 
definition of “new animal drug” in section 201(v) of the Act includes 
“any drug intended for use for animals other than man . . . the 
composition of which is such that such drug is not generally recognized . 
. . as safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof.”43  Generally, a new 
animal drug is ”deemed unsafe” under the Act unless the FDA has 
approved a NADA for that particular use, or unless the drug is only for 
investigational use and conforms to exemptions for such use under an 
Investigational New Animal Drug (INAD).44  The FDA justified this 
regulatory structure for genetically engineered animals on the grounds 
                                                
39 See PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD & BIOTECHNOLOGY, ISSUES IN THE REGULATION 




40 General Q&A, supra note 3. 
41 FDA Issues Final Guidance on Regulating Genetically Engineered Animals, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEven 
ts/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2009/ucm109066.htm.   
42 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(g)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1); 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 12, at 5. 
43 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(v)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(v)(1); 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 12, at 5–6.  
44 GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 12, at 6.  A second exception exists 
where the application meets the regulations promulgated under section 512(a)(4) 
or (5) of the Act. 
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that the rDNA construct in a genetically engineered animal meets the 
FDCA’s definition of “drug” because it is intended to affect the structure 
or function of the body of the animal.45  Each new animal drug approval 
covers all animals containing the same rDNA construct derived from the 
same transformation event, including animals containing the rDNA 
construct as a result of breeding between a non-genetically engineered 
animal and a genetically engineered animal.46  
 The FDA evaluates submitted NADAs to determine whether the 
new animal drug is safe and effective for its intended use.47  
Effectiveness of an article intended to alter a characteristic of an animal 
is demonstrated by showing that the genetically engineered animal has 
the claimed altered characteristic.48   
 Safety of an animal drug is established through a risk-based 
analysis centering on the molecular characterization and durability of the 
construct in question,49 as well as a broader assessment, consistent with 
the FDA’s Final Guidance Document, of food and environmental 
safety.50  Food derived from a genetically engineered animal must be 
safe for humans or animals consuming it.51  The Center for Veterinary 
Medicine (CVM) of the FDA studies toxicity by examining any relevant 
changes in the physiology of the animal and in the composition of edible 
tissues.52  If the expression product is shown to be safe and the 
composition of edible tissues from the genetically engineered animal is 
shown to be “as safe as those from animals of the same or comparable 
type that are commonly and safely consumed,”53 then there is a 
presumption that the food from the genetically engineered animal is safe.      
 When the FDA reviews and approves an INAD or NADA it 
must comply with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA), including a review of environmental risks where required.54  
Considered environmental risks include whether the article itself poses 
risks to humans, animals, or the environment; whether in the event of an 
environmental release, the genetically engineered animal poses more risk 
than its non-genetically engineered counterpart; and whether there are 
                                                
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 7.  
47 Id. at 13.  
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 21–23.  
50 Id. at 23–25. 
51 Id. at 23.  
52 Id. at 23–24. 
53 Id. at 24.  
54 Id. at 8.  
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any other safety questions that have not been adequately addressed by 
the sponsor.55 
 Following the release of its draft guidance on the regulation of 
genetically engineered animals in 2008, the FDA received a total of 
almost 29,000 comments over the sixty-day public comment period.56  
Approximately 28,000 were form letters or general statements about 
genetically engineered animals or the guidance.57  The majority of 
comments opposed the genetic engineering of animals.58  Approximately 
sixty of the remaining suggestions were “what [the FDA] consider to be 
substantive.”59  These comments were principally focused on eleven 
issues, the most salient to this discussion being: the adequacy and 
appropriateness of using the NADA provisions to exert regulatory 
oversight of genetically engineered animals; the adequacy of the FDA’s 
approach to address animal health and safety, food safety, and 
environmental safety; and the need for transparency and public input in 
the oversight of genetically engineered animals.60 
 The FDA maintained that the statutory definition of “drug” 
applied to the rDNA construct intended to alter the structure or function 
of an animal and that it “d[id] not believe it necessary to promulgate new 
regulations because the existing regulatory structure is adequate to 
review the safety and effectiveness of [genetically engineered,] animal-
related applications.”61  The FDA likewise defended its consideration of 
health and safety concerns, noting that the regulations require both a 
finding that the drug is safe for consumption and consideration of 
environmental risks under the broad umbrella of the National 
Environmental Policy Act.62  
 A number of comments noted that the NADA process does not 
allow for much public input.63  The Trade Secrets Act prohibits the FDA 
from revealing any information acquired through the New Animal Drug 
                                                
55 Id. at 8.  
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approval process.64  Some comments posited that a lack of transparency 
was inappropriate for products of new and controversial technology, 
while others stated that developers of genetically engineered animals 
have the same need and deserve the same right to protect their 
intellectual property as do developers of “conventional human and new 
animal drugs.”65   
 In its Final Guidance Document, the FDA stated that it was 
“interested in increasing the transparency of its deliberations and 
actions”66 and intended to hold public advisory committee meetings prior 
to approving any genetically engineered animal.67  On September 3rd, 
2010, the FDA declared that AquAdvantage Salmon “is as safe as food 
from conventional Atlantic salmon.”68  From September 19th to the 21st, 
2010, the FDA held two public meetings on AquAdvantage Salmon 
paneled by the agency’s Veterinary Medicine Advisory Committee 
(VMAC).69  
III. THE PUBLIC MEETING ON AQUADVANTAGE SALMON’S RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
 Because a new animal drug is deemed unsafe unless the FDA 
has approved a NADA for that particular use,70 under the FDCA, the 
NADA must demonstrate that the regulated article is “safe and 
effective.”71  VMAC’s charge during the public meetings was to assess 
the safety and efficacy of AquAdvantage Salmon’s rDNA construct and 
provide advice and recommendations to the FDA.72 
 The Committee agreed with the FDA that “there is no greater 
effect as a result of the incorporation of [the rDNA] construct than the 
                                                
64 See 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (2006) (prohibiting information acquired under the 
authority of several sections related to the Animal Drug approval process from 
being revealed). 
65 FDA’s Response to Public Comments, supra note 56.  
66 GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 12, at 13.    
67 Id. 
68 See Andrew Pollack, Modified Salmon is Safe, F.D.A. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/04/health/policy/04salmon.html.  
69 See Food & Drug Admin., Veterinary Medicine Advisory Committee, Notice 
of Meeting, 75 Fed. Reg. 52,605 (Aug. 26, 2010).  
70 See Charge to the VMAC for the AquAdvantage Salmon Meeting, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryComm 
ittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/VeterinaryMedicineAdvisoryCommittee/uc
m226083.htm. 
71 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(v)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(v)(1).  
72 See Charge to the VMAC for the AquAdvantage Salmon Meeting, supra note 
70.  
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normal selection process that takes place during domestication and 
improvement of domestic animals through selective breeding.”73  And 
the construct qua animal drug was unquestionably effective—the data 
was “straight up” that AquAdvantage Salmon grows faster than its 
conventional counterparts.74 
 Despite these conclusions, serious doubts were expressed toward 
the end of the meeting with regard to the adequacy of the data used.75  
Attendees raised concerns about the small sample sizes used in 
AquaBounty Technologies’ research76 as well as the results of these 
studies.77  Dr. Jodi Ann Lapidus of the Committee, characterizing the 
data as “fairly suggestive [and] preliminary,”78 and the process as “a bit 
ad hoc,”79 argued that a “more rigorous experimental design [and more] 
rigorous epidemiologic principles” were needed to answer some of the 
Committee’s questions.80  Other complaints centered on the safety of the 
salmon and the environmental risks they posed. Generally, individuals 
were concerned with a few specific issues, including: disparities in the 
level of insulin-like growth factor 1 (IGF-1) between AquAdvantage 
Salmon and the control;81 disparities in the level of vitamin B6 between 
AquAdvantage Salmon and the control;82 the limited sample sizes in 
allergenicity tests;83 the lack of independent, peer-reviewed studies to 
support some data;84 general animal safety and health;85 and the 
                                                
73 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VETERINARY MED. ADVISORY COMM. MEETING: 
AQUADVANTAGE SALMON 352 (2010) [hereinafter VMAC MEETING], available 
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMa 
terials/VeterinaryMedicineAdvisoryCommittee/UCM230471.pdf.  
74 Id. at 378.  
75 See id. at 352–53.  
76 Id. at 352.  
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 355. 
79 Id. at 366. 
80 Id. at 355.  
81 See, e.g., id. at 288–90 (noting a forty percent difference in IGF-1 levels 
between the control and the engineered fish).   
82 Id. at 292. 
83 Id. at 290–91 (noting that risk of potential allergenicity was twenty percent 
higher in AquAdvantage Salmon, but that this figure was not statistically 
significant because the sample size was only six fish).  
84 Id. at 293 (noting that the analysis of IGF levels looked at only two studies—a 
peer-reviewed publication from 1992 and an AquaBounty study from 2004—
and the analysis of allergen potency focused on a 2006 study furnished by 
AquaBounty). 
85 Id. at 301–03 (noting AquaBounty’s history of “extensive culling of 
deformed, diseased, and dying fish before any of the data in the application was 
 
No. 2] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 425 
limitations of the fertilization process and the risk of salmon escaping 
from the facility.86  More relevant to the issue at hand, complaints were 
aimed broadly toward the lack of transparency and few opportunities for 
public input allowed by the approval process.87   
 The notice of the September 20th meeting was published in the 
Federal Register on August 26th, a mere three and a half weeks before the 
meeting date.88  Darrell Rogers, of the Alliance for Natural Health in the 
United States, noted that scientific studies have either “not been released 
or have been released so late in the approval process that it is impossible 
for the public and experts to assess whether scientific burdens have been 
met.”89  Jaydee Hanson, of the Center for Food Safety, added that the 
180-page scientific assessment briefing packet was received by the 
public “only 10 days [before comments were due].”90  Ms. Hanson 
further stated that “the most striking thing was how little data the 
company had produced over the last 15 years. Or at least how little data 
was being provided to us. We have discovered today that there is data 
that is not in this dataset.”91             
 Regulating transgenic animals intended for human consumption 
under the FDCA ensures that the process takes place almost entirely 
behind closed doors.  The Trade Secrets Act prohibits the FDA from 
sharing any information with the public before a decision is made on an 
application, in the interest of protecting the applicant’s trade secrets.92  
The FDA does not even have the power to disclose whether an 
application exists until after publication of approval in the Federal 
Register.93  Sponsors may disclose the application, as AquaBounty 
Technologies has, but even then “no data or information contained in the 
                                                                                                         
collected,” as well as the fact that “a new animal drug must be evaluated for any 
adverse outcomes it causes for any and all animals who receive the drug,” and 
that the FDA did not consider the health or safety of the animals excluded from 
the food supply). 
86 Id. at 306–10.  
87 See, e.g., id. at 311 (“The FDA process for approving new animal drugs 
allows for neither robust public participation nor thorough consideration of 
environmental hazards.”). 
88 Food & Drug Admin., Veterinary Medicine Advisory Committee, Notice of 
Meeting, 75 Fed. Reg. 52,605 (Aug. 26, 2010).  
89 VMAC MEETING, supra note 73, at 282.  
90 Id. at 297; cf. id. at 311 (“Until the release of the [environmental assessment] 
two weeks ago, the public has had no opportunity to learn more about, assess, or 
raise questions about potential impacts.”). 
91 Id. at 297.  
92 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (2006).  
93 21 C.F.R. § 514.11 (2012).  
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file is available for public disclosure before such approval is 
published[.]”94  The Commissioner may, however, “in his discretion, 
disclose a summary of selected portions of the safety and effectiveness 
data as are appropriate for public consideration of a specific pending 
issue, e.g., at an open session of a Food and Drug Administration 
advisory committee[.]”95  Regardless as to the oddity or 
inappropriateness of regulating rDNA constructs as animal drugs, this 
statutory policy is especially unsuitable for products designed for human 
consumption. 
IV. TRANSPARENCY, PUBLIC OPINION, AND POSSIBLE REFORM 
A. A Prima Facie Reason to Abandon Trade Secret Protection for 
Genetically Engineered Animals  
 The FDCA and The Uniform Trade Secrets Act prohibit the 
FDA from sharing any information about an application, absent sponsor 
disclosure, before a decision is made.96  The existence of a NADA file 
must be publicly disclosed or acknowledged in order for the 
Commissioner to, in his discretion, disclose a summary of selected 
portions of the safety and effectiveness data as are appropriate for public 
consideration of a specific pending issue.97  As a matter of policy, and in 
order to increase transparency, the agency intends to “hold public 
advisory committee meetings prior to approving any [genetically 
engineered] animal.”98  It follows that the FDA intends all applications to 
be disclosed and some data to be publicly available at advisory 
committee meetings prior to any approval of a new animal drug for a 
genetically engineered animal.  The extent of such safety and 
effectiveness data is curbed only by “appropriate[ness] for public 
consideration[.]”99      
 Public support for biotechnology, including genetically 
engineered animal products, is on the decline.100  A survey performed for 
                                                
94 Id. at § 514.11(d). 
95 Id.  
96 Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 331(j).   
97 21 C.F.R. § 514.11(d).  
98 GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 12, at 13. 
99 21 C.F.R. § 514.11(d). 
100 See, e.g., Nathaniel Logar & Leslie K. Pollock, Transgenic Fish: Is a New 
Policy Framework Necessary for a New Technology?, in 8 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 
18 (2005), available at http://cspo.org/documents/logarpollock.pdf (citing data 
that “Americans’ attitudes towards genetic engineering and biotechnology 
generally show a decline in support fur such technologies over past 5–15 
years”).   
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the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology found that sixty-five 
percent of consumers disapproved of the idea of creating transgenic fish 
for human consumption.101  Knowingly withholding data will not serve 
to increase public trust in the regulatory process or in the safety of the 
final product.   
 Moreover, it is not clear what the trade secret justification was 
for withholding data from the committee advisory meeting.  First, the 
data provided in the 180-page briefing packet was sufficiently detailed 
with regard to the sequence of the rDNA construct, the purpose of the 
modification, the details of how the rDNA construct was assembled, and 
the construction of the transgenic salmon (including both the method and 
intermediate organisms within the process). This high level of detail 
would preclude the protection of many, if not most, trade secrets.102  
Second, options more sophisticated than inserting a promoter and 
termination sequence from ocean pout into an Atlantic salmon are being 
researched “that are almost ready for use in real products.”103  One 
scientist has claimed that “[i]f someone wanted to make AquAdvantage 
today, there are emerging technologies that would allow a replacement of 
the normal promoter for Atlantic salmon with an Atlantic salmon 
promoter that is always on. The resulting fish would have no possibility 
of unintended genetic changes and 100% DNA from Atlantic salmon.”104          
 A number of commenters on the FDA’s guidance noted that the 
bar on public disclosure “is particularly inappropriate for products of a 
new and controversial technology such as the genetic engineering of 
animals.”105  The FDA could, as a matter of policy, broadly interpret the 
safety and effectiveness data “appropriate for public consideration” at 
advisory committee meetings, at least until the genetic engineering 
technologies and the public perception of such data improves.  Even if 
such data is not strictly “appropriate” for or understandable to the public, 
                                                
101 PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE GENE MEDIA 
FORUM, “THE GENE IS OUT OF THE BOTTLE: WHERE TO NEXT?” SURVEY 
HIGHLIGHTS 2 (2001), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/ww 
wpewtrustsorg/Research/vf_biotech_gene_bottle.pdf.  
102 See, e.g., BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 8, at 9–13 (discussing the molecular 
characterization of the construct, including a schematic representation for 
“generating the opAFP-GHc2 construct employed in the AquAdvantage 
Salmon”).   
103 Anastasia Bodnar, Comment to Risk Assessment and Mitigation of 
AquAdvantage Salmon, BIOFORTIFIED (Oct. 18, 2010, 1:11 PM), http://www.bi 
ofortified.org/2010/10/salmon/#comment-14213.  
104 Id.    
105 FDA’s Response to Public Comments, supra note 56.   
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improving the transparency of the data will allow increased opportunities 
for peer review, which may alleviate some of the concerns expressed by 
VMAC members and the public during the advisory committee meetings.   
B. Public Disclosure as Abandonment of Trade Secrecy 
 A trade secret is “a process or device for continuous use in the 
operation of . . . business” and “may consist of any formula, pattern, 
device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, 
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over 
competitors who do not know or use it.”106  Generally speaking, a trade 
secret is known only to one or a few people, and is kept secret from the 
general public.107  Disclosure of a trade secret may result in an 
abandonment of the essential element of secrecy.108  A number of federal 
and state cases bear on the issue of whether, and under what 
circumstances, the disclosure of a trade secret results in an abandonment 
of secrecy.      
 Courts have held that a general public disclosure of a trade secret 
by a party asserting a protectable interest, as in a patent application or a 
published material, results in abandonment of the element of secrecy and 
destruction of trade secret status.109  When, as in the case of 
AquAdvantage Salmon, the FDA discloses the mechanisms by which a 
company creates a transgenic animal, trade secret property rights 
contained in the disclosure are extinguished.  This “abandonment” 
undermines the need for secrecy throughout the premarket approval 
process. 
 The Supreme Court considered whether trade secret property 
right protection should continue after public disclosure of data in 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,110 which concerned a statutory scheme 
somewhat similar to the FDCA statutory scheme described above.  
Provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA) “authorize the [EPA] to use data submitted by an applicant for 
registration of a pesticide [product] in evaluating the application of a 
                                                
106 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939). 
107 See id. 
108 Donald M. Zupanec, Disclosure of Trade Secret as Abandonment of Secrecy, 
92 A.L.R.3d 138 (1979).   
109 See BondPro Corp. v. Siemens Power Generation, Inc., 463 F.3d 702, 706 
(7th Cir. 2006) (stating that a trade secret that becomes public knowledge, as a 
process was disclosed to the world in a patent application, is no longer a trade 
secret); Taylor v. Babbitt, 760 F.Supp.2d 80, 86 (D. D.C. 2011); Saini v. Int’l 
Game Tech., 434 F.Supp.2d 913, 919 (D. Nev. 2006).   
110 467 U.S. 986 (1984).   
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subsequent applicant, and to disclose publicly some of the submitted 
data.”111  Section 10 of FIFRA authorizes public disclosure of all health, 
safety, and environmental data, even though it may result in disclosure of 
trade secrets.112  Monsanto, an inventor, producer, and seller of 
pesticides, brought suit, alleging, inter alia, that the data-disclosure 
provisions of FIFRA effected a “taking” of property without just 
compensation.113      
 In 1978, FIFRA was amended, revising its existing data-
consideration and data-disclosure provisions.  Congress added a new 
subsection, 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d), “that provides for disclosure of all 
health, safety, and environmental data to qualified requesters,”114 except 
disclosure of information that would reveal “manufacturing or quality 
control processes” or certain details about inert ingredients “unless the 
Administrator has first determined that the disclosure is necessary to 
protect against an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment.”115  The District Court found that much of the health, 
safety, and environmental data Monsanto sought to protect “contain[ned] 
or relate[d] to trade secrets.”116    
 The Supreme Court recognized that the extent of the property 
right in a trade secret “is defined by the extent to which the owner of the 
secret protects his interest from disclosure to others.”117  Additionally, 
the Court found that information that is “public knowledge or that is 
generally known in an industry cannot be a trade secret.”118  Because 
Monsanto was on notice of the ways in which the EPA was statutorily 
authorized to use and disclose data received from applicants for product 
registration, Monsanto “could not have had a reasonable, investment-
backed expectation that EPA would keep the data [submitted after the 
                                                
111 Id. at 990. 
112 Id. at 996. 
113 Id. at 998. 
114 Id. at 995–96; see 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d)(1) (2006) (“All information concerning 
the objectives, methodology, results, or significance of any test or experiment 
performed on or with a registered or previously registered pesticide or its 
separate ingredients, impurities, or degradation products, and any information 
concerning the effects of such pesticide on any organism or the behavior of such 
pesticide in the environment, including, but not limited to, data on safety to fish 
and wildlife, humans and other mammals, plants, animals, and soil, and studies 
on persistence, translocation and fate in the environment, and metabolism, shall 
be available for disclosure to the public.”). 
115 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 996 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136(h)(d)).  
116 Id. at 998.   
117 Id. at 1002.  
118 Id.  
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1978 FIFRA amendments] confidential beyond the limits prescribed in 
the amended statute itself.”119  Any applicant knew that information 
relating to the formula of products could be revealed by the EPA to any 
federal agency and to the public at a public hearing when necessary to 
carry out their duties under FIFRA.120  The statute also provided 
Monsanto notice that “much of the health, safety, and efficacy data 
provided by it could be disclosed to the general public at any time.”121  
Thus, any voluntary submission of data in exchange for the economic 
advantages concomitant with product registration could not be a 
taking.122          
 Like the applicants under FIFRA, new animal drug applicants 
under FDCA are on notice that the FDA may disclose a summary of 
safety and effectiveness data as appropriate for public consideration at 
advisory committee meetings.123  Applicants are also aware that the FDA 
intends to hold public advisory meetings for all applications for 
genetically engineered animals intended for human consumption.124  Any 
trade secrets disclosed to the public through such meetings, such as those 
found in the AquAdvantage Salmon meeting materials, are likely 
extinguished.   
 All of this is not to suggest that no trade secret protection should 
exist for NADAs prior to the announcement of a public meeting.  
Biotechnology companies should be able to retain their competitive 
advantage during the period between the submission of an application 
and the VMAC meeting.  It is less clear, however, why safety and 
effectiveness data should not be fully disclosed during the comment 
period prior to and after the advisory committee meetings.  If the purpose 
of the lack of transparency is to protect trade secrets, and many, if not 
most of those secrets, will be extinguished through disclosure, 
maintaining such a high degree of secrecy outlives its purpose. As such, 
the FDA should more seriously consider keeping the public apprised of 
the status of active applications after this time, even if it means a second 
summary of safety findings prior to final approval.                                   
 
 
                                                
119 Id. at 1006. 
120 Id. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. at 1007. 
123 21 C.F.R. § 514.11(d) (2012).   
124 GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 12, at 13. 
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C. Other Mechanisms for Increased Public Review  
1. Lengthen the Comment Period Prior to Advisory Committee Meetings  
 In a letter to the FDA Commissioner, Jean Halloran, Director of 
Food Policy Initiatives for Consumers Union, wrote that her group was 
“concerned about trying to undertake this review [of 255 pages of 
technical information] in such a constrained time period when there are 
serious issues of food safety involved.”125  In particular, Consumers 
Union questioned the logic behind the fourteen days given to review the 
information—an “extremely brief period”—when the FDA had eleven 
years to review the application and there was no statutory timetable 
requiring particular expediency.126  The group requested that the review 
period be extended from fourteen days to the standard sixty days given 
for pharmaceuticals or medical devices.127   
2. Create an Independent Body to Communicate with the Public about 
Food Safety 
 On January 28th, 2002, the European Union adopted legislation 
authorizing the creation of a European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), an 
“independent source of scientific advice and communication on risks 
associated with the food chain.”128  EFSA was created after a call for a 
new authority to “contribute to a high level of consumer health 
protection” and to “help restore and maintain consumer confidence.”129  
Premised on the belief that consumers “have the right to expect 
information on food quality and constituents that is helpful and clearly 
presented, so that informed choices can be made,” one of EFSA’s main 
goals was to directly communicate with the public in order to keep 
consumers informed of emerging food safety concerns and risks from 
certain foods.130     
 Even if risk assessment continues to be carried out by the FDA 
and its advisory committees like VMAC, the creation of an independent 
body to act as a liaison to the public and clearly communicate the goals 
                                                
125 Jean Halloran & Michael Hansen, Letter to Commissioner Hamburg and 
Deputy Commissioner Sharfstein, CONSUMER’S UNION 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/FDA-ltr-GE-salmon.pdf.  
126 Id.  
127 Id. 
128 About EFSA, EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY AUTH., http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/ 
aboutefsa.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).  
129 COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., WHITE PAPER ON FOOD SAFETY 5 
(2000), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub06_ 
en.pdf.  
130 Id. at 4.  
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of the regulatory process, the status of disclosed NADAs, and potential 
risks and benefits of genetically engineered products intended for human 
consumption would help restore trust in the system.   
 The independent authority could also serve as a go-between for 
agencies who share regulatory authority over genetically engineered 
animals.  For example, the Commissioner of the FDA is required to 
consult with the Assistant Administrator of the National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) to produce “a report on any environmental risks 
associated with genetically engineered seafood products, including the 
impact on wild fish stocks.”131  Leaked e-mails between senior scientists 
at the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS) and NOAA chronicle 
serious concerns about the FDA’s treatment of genetically engineered 
salmon and the lack of consultation with other agencies.132  One email 
from FWS staff to NOAA revealed that: 
Shortly after the Atlantic salmon was listed as endangered, several 
of us from USFWS and NMFS spent 2 days down in Maryland 
meeting with Aqua Bounty and FDA about development of 
genetically modified salmon and discussion around the need for 
FDA to engage in Section 7 consultation with the Services. We 
never heard a peep out of FDA or Aqua Bounty after that.133  
 Mr. Gregory Moyer, a regional geneticist from FWS, wrote a 
letter outlining criticisms and concerns regarding the VMAC briefing 
packet for AquAdvantage Salmon ten days after the public meetings.134  
Members of the Conservation Genetics Community of Practice of FWS 
wrote a letter one week later arguing that the evidence provided in the 
briefing packet fell short of “providing an actual risk assessment of 
putative environmental damages in the event of escapement.”135  Because 
these letters were written two to three weeks after the public meeting and 
                                                
131 21 U.S.C.A. § 2106.  
132 Newly Disclosed Government Documents Conclude GE Salmon Pose a 
Critical Threat to Marine Environments, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, 
http://truefoodnow.org/2010/10/27/newly-disclosed-government-documents-
conclude-ge-salmon-pose-a-critical-threat-to-marine-environments/ (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2012).  
133 Id.  
134 Gregory R. Moyer, Letter to the U.S. Dept. of Interior (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://stopgefish.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/fws_moyers_to_fda_vmac_sept30
2010.pdf.  
135 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Conservation Genetics Community of 
Practice (COP), Letter to the U.S. Dept. of Interior (Oct. 6, 2010), 
http://stopgefish.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/cop_fws_to_vmac_oct62010.pdf.  
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because no information has been publicly available since that time, there 
is no way to tell whether these criticisms were incorporated into the 
FDA’s subsequent analysis of safety, or whether the FDA consulted with 
FWS, NMFS, or NOAA.  An independent authority could help ensure 
that the FDA meets its statutory requirements of consulting with relevant 
agencies to assess the safety and efficacy of NADAs.  
CONCLUSION 
 Most complaints surrounding AquAdvantage Salmon have 
concentrated on concerns both regarding the risk posed to other fish and 
the environment should they escape, as well as differences between 
genetically engineered salmon and farm-raised salmon that could pose a 
risk to consumers.  To increase public trust, more should be done to keep 
consumers apprised of the status of NADAs during premarket approval. 
Additionally, more needs to be done to ensure the validity of the data 
used to determine whether the genetically engineered animals are safe for 
human consumption.  By focusing on improving the transparency of the 
process, the public will have a better understanding of which deficiencies 
in data are real and which are not. Such an understanding would enhance 
public confidence in the safety of genetically engineered food as 
worldwide demand for protein sources continues to increase.    
